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The number of states with nuclear weapons has grown at a much slower rate than many
predicted during the early years of the Cold War. Yet the reasons for this slow rate of proliferation
are not well understood. What is maintaining the (predominantly non-nuclear) status quo? Other
work takes external threats and the credibility of security guarantees as given, but I show how
nuclear proliferation can shape and be shaped by both. This approach allows me to show how
the decisions of proliferators, their allies, and their adversaries are intertwined. This leads to a
previously unexplored effect of proliferation: in addition to the defensive and deterrent capability
of nuclear weapons, nuclear possession can also cause great powers to tighten their alliance com-
mitments. Great powers therefore have incentives to dissuade nuclear pursuit through threats of
sanctions when they are capable of imposing them and through heightened security guarantees
when they cannot.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Membership in the nuclear club has grown more slowly than many expected during the
early years of the Cold War. Although a handful of countries have acquired nuclear weapons
capability, many others that were expected to go nuclear have not. Within this group of non-
nuclear states, however, we still see significant variation in the levels of nuclear development and
circumstances surrounding their decisions. Several states, such as Japan, Germany, and Brazil,
have achieved a level of latent capability that would enable them to achieve a working weapon
in a relatively short period of time if they so chose, yet have never expressly pursued a weapons
program. Meanwhile others, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Libya, have begun the active
development of nuclear weapons, only to be pressured into abandoning their programs. Still
others, including North Korea, South Africa, and Israel, have gone as far as developing working
weapons over the objections of other states. Thus there is significant variation not only in the
decisions of states to pursue nuclear weapons, but also in the willingness and ability of others to
prevent this acquisition. In order to understand the decisions of both would-be proliferators and
those who would stop them, we must understand the influence of the circumstances underlying
these decisions and how changes in them could lead states to make different decisions, opting for
nuclear pursuit rather than restraint.
Existing literature on proliferation tends to consider either the motivations of the would-
be nuclear power or of existing major powers independently, without allowing for interaction
between the two. Additionally, few studies consider threatening states as independent actors in
this process.1 However, when considering the incentives of proliferators, allies, and adversaries
1Debs and Monteiro (2016) is a notable exception here.
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together, I find that proliferation by a subordinate state can sometimes make a great power more
likely to intervene on the subordinate’s behalf, transforming a previously incredible defensive
commitment into a credible one. Therefore, some states may pursue nuclear weapons not only to
provide for their own security, but also to enhance a great power’s commitment to that security.
Thus in addition to their defensive and deterrent potential, nuclear weapons may also have the
previously unexamined benefit of drawing great power allies closer. Further, a credible defensive
commitment cannot be made incredible through nuclear acquisition, meaning proliferators need
not fear that they will be abandoned after achieving nuclear status. This possibility arises from
a preference on the part of great powers: all else equal, I posit that great powers prefer that if
their allies are defeated militarily, those allies do not possess nuclear weapons. That is, a loss by
a nuclear ally is costlier for a great power than a loss by a non-nuclear one.
Great powers, in turn, have incentives to prevent proliferation when undertaken by states
in volatile relationships. In these instances, the threat of economic or military sanctions can
sometimes force a subordinate state to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Yet if a great power is
unable to make such sanctions sufficiently costly, it can find itself entrapped by an ally’s acquisition
of a nuclear weapon. In such cases, strengthening a security guarantee can become an attractive
option for preventing proliferation. Thus both nuclear proliferation itself and the threat thereof
can have the effect of drawing great power allies closer to their prote´ge´s and tightening hierarchies
in the international system. Proliferation decisions are not one-sided, but rather depend upon a
state’s existing relationships and position in the international system, and such decisions can in
turn alter this structure.
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Chapter 2
A Strategic Theory of Proliferation
Despite the wealth of empirical studies on the subject of nuclear weapons, we lack an
organizing framework within which to understand these often disparate findings. Although it
accounts for strategic interaction between proliferating states, great powers, and adversaries, the
most comprehensive model of nuclear proliferation to date (Debs and Monteiro 2016) cannot
explain why, despite the threats of abandonment often leveled at states attempting to build their
own nuclear arsenals, we sometimes see great powers’ commitments actually increase upon nuclear
acquisition. The most notable instance is Israel, but there is also evidence that South Africa’s
nuclear strategy was predicated upon provoking the US to intervene in the region by quietly
revealing its nuclear capability if necessary to draw the US in (Reiss 1995).
2.1 Motivation for Nuclear Pursuit
Table 2.1 shows a partial list of states whose proliferation paths are of interest. The first
column lists observable instances of proliferation — states that acquired nuclear weapons over the
objections of great powers.1 The second column represents states that explicitly expressed interest
in nuclear acquisition (sometimes to the point of beginning a weapons program) or have the latent
capability to develop a weapon but have as yet not chosen to do so. These are “non-observations”
– instances where proliferation has not occurred but could reasonably have been expected. The
third column includes observations where states’ programs have been militarily stopped (Syria
and Iraq) or whose progress has been significantly slowed such that a working weapon has not
1Note that this list includes all states that acquired nuclear weapons after the US, USSR, and UK, which were
the first three to do so.
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yet been acquired (Iran), and the fourth column represents instances of explicit renunciation of
existing weapons.2
Table 2.1: Nuclear Status
Acquired
Interested or
Capable
Stopped Renounced
China Germany Syria South Africa
France South Korea Iraq Ukraine
India Taiwan Iran
Pakistan Libya
South Africa Japan
North Korea Brazil
Israel
I suggest that the differences among these columns can be represented by differences in the
ability of proliferating states to develop weapons programs (i.e. to withstand costly sanctions) and
their motivation to do so, shaped by 1) the presence or absence of credible great power defensive
commitments, and 2) the nature of the external threat.3 For instance, France had a high level
of autonomy when faced with an incredible commitment from the US and a deterrable adversary
(the USSR) following World War II and thus was able to develop a nuclear program.4 Yet at the
same time, West Germany, although facing the same threat and covered by the same questionable
US umbrella, was constrained by the hierarchical nature of its relationship with the US, causing
different observable outcomes. In the category of states without nuclear weapons, we also see
variation. Although South Korea was faced with a significant threat from North Korea following
the Korean War, it relied too heavily on the United States for its security to complete its weapons
program. The threatened US withdrawal of troops from the peninsula would have been too costly.
2I include Ukraine here but not Belarus or Kazakhstan due to evidence that the former possessed some (albeit
a disputed) level of control over their inherited weapons where the latter two did not.
3This corresponds roughly with the willingness and opportunity framing used by both Debs and Monteiro (2016)
and Jo and Gartzke (2007) .
4I use the terms “autonomy” and “hierarchy” as antonyms throughout; states in relationships characterized
by a high level of hierarchy have a low level autonomy, and vice versa. “Hierarchy” is the overarching concept of
interest.
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Yet Japan, also in the non-nuclear column, possesses the autonomy to acquire nuclear weapons
but also has a credible defensive commitment from the US, obviating the need to do so; its limits
are self-imposed rather than external. Finally, states whose programs have been ended by force
faced undeterrable threats and lacked both credible defensive commitments and the autonomy to
withstand attacks on their developing programs.
The framework here explains variation not only among observably different outcomes, in
which some states acquire nuclear weapons and others do not, but also among those cases in which
the final proliferation decision is the same but the underlying circumstances are quite different.
Consequently, it identifies when changes in these circumstances, such as shifts in security guar-
antees, may be expected to cause non-nuclear states to change course and begin down the road
to proliferation and when such changes are unlikely to have such an effect. Critically, these cir-
cumstances can and do change. The recent electoral victories of Shinzo Abe’s Liberal Democratic
Party in Japan, for instance, have given him the two-thirds majority in both houses needed to
pursue his visions of constitutional change, including rewriting Article 9 and potentially removing
the institutional constraints on Japan’s military. Further, Abe’s appointment to the position of
defense minister, Tomomi Inada, has openly considered the possibility of nuclear weapons, saying
in 2011 that “Japan should consider possessing nuclear weapons as a national strategy in the long
term.”5 Likewise, Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea has caused some within Ukraine to doubt
the wisdom of their decision to return to Russia the nuclear weapons inherited with the fall of
the Soviet Union. According to Ukrainian MP Pavlo Rizanenko, “[T]here’s a strong sentiment
in Ukraine that we made a big mistake. In the future, no matter how the situation is resolved
in Crimea, we need a much stronger Ukraine. If you have nuclear weapons people don’t invade
you.”6 Thus although the current state of the world includes few nuclear powers, it is critical to
5Okamura, Natsuki and Isamu Nikaido. “Defense chief Inada seen as possible spoiler of relations.” The Asahi
Shimbun, August 4, 2016, accessed March 15, 2017. http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201608040051.
html.
6Zurcher, Anthony. “Ukraine’s nuclear regret?” BBC News, March 20, 2014, accessed February 12, 2017,
http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-echochambers-26676051.
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understand what is maintaining this status quo and what could upset it.
The status of nuclear weapons programs thus depends not only on whether states have
the ability to acquire nuclear weapons, but also whether they have the motivation to do so. To
answer the question of what motivates nuclear pursuit, we must consider the circumstances that
might make such development attractive and feasible. I examine states’ external threats, credible
defensive guarantees, and hierarchical relationships in turn.
2.2 The Demand Side
2.2.1 External Threat
First, the level of external threat states face influences whether they have the motivation
to build nuclear weapons. States with a high and persistent level of threat, such as those in
enduring rivalries or with historically hostile neighbors, are more likely to find nuclear weapons
attractive for their deterrent and defensive purposes than those lacking such an existential threat.
For instance, Rajagopalan (2008) argues that the primary purpose of India’s nuclear weapons is
to deter China and Pakistan, both themselves nuclear, while the existential threat posed by India,
with its superior conventional capability, motivates Pakistan. Thus, Powell’s (2003) argument is
applicable here; nuclear weapons may allow small states to deter major powers in issues where a
small state is clearly more resolved than its opponent (such as issues of “regime survival”). This
means that states facing threats to their survival should find nuclear weapons more useful than
states taking offensive action, as the latter will find the potential for destruction an unacceptably
high risk compared with their goals.
2.2.2 Credible Defensive Guarantees
Second, the degree to which states have credible defensive guarantees from great powers
also influences their motivation. The presence of a credible great power commitment can make the
costly process of nuclear weapons development less attractive; if states are secure in the knowledge
that another will come to their defense, they are less likely to find nuclear weapons a necessary or
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worthwhile investment. On the other hand, if allies fear that a great power is unlikely to defend
them in the event of an attack, they may turn to other means to provide for their own defense.
As Reiter (2014) and Lanoszka (2014) suggest, incredible security commitments can create a
fear of abandonment. If the costs of defending a prote´ge´ are high, great powers have incentives to
renege on their security commitments in the event of an attack, making them unreliable defenders.
Knowing this, subordinate states may wish to pursue nuclear weapons in order to provide for their
own defense. In some cases this will not be possible; some states will simply not have the resources
to commit to the endeavor. This lack of resources has a constraining effect and helps explain why
many states with incredible security commitments do not pursue nuclear weapons.
Thus countries like Japan or Germany, which have historically possessed highly credible
defensive guarantees from the US,7 may see no reason to shoulder the burden of a costly nuclear
program despite threatening environments. Similarly, the integration of Canadian defense against
the Soviet nuclear threat into the US defensive system clearly obviated the need for Canada to
provide such a system for itself (Reynolds 2000). Although the empirical findings on security
guarantees are mixed, Bleek and Lorber (2014) tackle these results and find that security guar-
antees make proliferation less likely, at all levels of the process, suggesting that the loss of such
guarantees may make proliferation increasingly likely.
The question of the conditions under which leaders honor alliance commitments during
war (Leeds 2003) can also be re-framed to ask under what conditions a great power would honor
its explicit or implicit obligation to protect a prote´ge´ in the event of an attack on the latter. In
particular, Leeds argues that abrogation is likely when the costs of violating the alliance agreement
are low (as with major powers) or when significant changes in circumstances between alliance
formation and invocation lead to the reevaluation of a state’s interests (Leeds 2003). These
conditions may be applied to the issue of when a great power’s commitment to a smaller state’s
defense is in question; if a great power’s costs of fighting in a conflict are high relative to whatever
7See Gavin (2012) for a discussion of US efforts to reassure West Germany that its defensive commitment was
secure following World War II.
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loss it would incur in the event of its partner’s defeat in a war, it may have an incentive to abandon
that partner.
2.3 The Supply Side
2.3.1 Hierarchy
Third, the level of hierarchy in which states exist, or the degree to which they are subor-
dinate to another state and thus vulnerable to costly military or economic sanctions, influences
their ability to acquire nuclear weapons. Even if states find nuclear possession attractive, they
may be unable to develop a program to the point of a working weapon if another state is able
to impose unacceptably high costs for doing so. For instance, the US threat to remove American
troops from South Korea played a critical role in ending that country’s covert nuclear weapons
program upon its discovery.
Nuclear acquisition is an expensive process, and opposition by great powers can render it
even more so. The desire to pursue nuclear weapons can therefore be tempered by the expectation
that additional, external costs will be imposed during the process. For instance, great powers
often play a critical role in bolstering the militaries of states within their spheres of influence, and
the threat of losing this assistance may have a deterrent effect on proliferation. South Korea relied
heavily on U.S. military and financial assistance, including the presence of U.S. troops, to ensure
its security following the Korean War, placing it in a position where the threats of US withdrawal
effectively ended its efforts. Similarly, the ability of great powers to impose economic sanctions
may render nuclear pursuit unbearably costly for states that are vulnerable to such leverage.
Further, the act of nuclear pursuit itself may provoke preventive strikes and wars (Fuhrmann and
Kreps 2010, Debs and Monteiro 2016, Bas and Coe 2016), which states must take into account
in their decision-making.8 Thus although the states that are most dependent on the support of
8Attacks on nuclear infrastructure may be specific cases of a more general form of targeting that can also take
the form of economic sanctions or the withdrawal of military support, which affect not only a state’s nuclear future
but also its military capabilities as a whole.
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great power patrons may also have the greatest desire to develop nuclear weapons technology,
this very level of dependence itself can allow great powers to prevent them from doing so. As in
Leeds’s (2003) work on alliances, if the smaller state’s power has increased over the course of the
relationship, making it less dependent, it may find that proliferation is more appealing as a result
of its increased ability to withstand sanctioning efforts by its more powerful ally.
Work on the effects of sanctions has found a selection effect causing the efficacy of eco-
nomic sanctions to be understated in earlier literature. Because the expected success of sanctions
influences the decision to use them (Smith 1996) and instances of economic coercion often end
before the threatened sanctions are actually imposed (Drezner 2003), their successes are often
unobserved. This logic extends to nonproliferation sanctions; they may be more effective than
usually credited because the potential for the threat of sanctions by great powers is enough to
deter militarily or economically dependent states from nuclear pursuit (Miller 2014). In the model
in the following section, this level of dependence emerges in the magnitude of the costs that patron
is capable of imposing through sanctions, which in turn affects both an adversary’s incentives to
attack and a proliferator’s likelihood of prevailing in a conflict.
When states do begin proliferation attempts, great powers can respond in a variety of ways.
They can attempt to punish by imposing sanctions, either economically or by withdrawing military
support, but they can also assist in this endeavor by providing economic or technical assistance
in the process.9 Debs and Monteiro (2016) refer to these as “carrot” and “stick” responses. For
instance, the United States pressured South Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program in the
1970s with threats of troop withdrawals (Choi and Park 2008), but France actively provided nuclear
assistance to Israel from 1959-1965 (Kroenig 2009). I consider attempts to dissuade proliferation
instances of sanctioning, while attempts to encourage proliferation are considered assistance. Both
sanctioning and assistance can take military, economic, or diplomatic forms. In this analysis I focus
on sanctioning rather than on assistance, but they are two sides of the same coin. Pursuing nuclear
9See Kroenig (2009) for a discussion of states providing sensitive nuclear assistance to others
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weapons may therefore also not be an option for states that rely heavily on the support of a great
power if they are aware that to do so would result in the imposition of unbearably high costs.
In some instances, however, a great power may not be able to exert enough pressure on
a prote´ge´ to prevent it from building nuclear weapons, even if the great power wishes to do so.
Therefore, it may be impossible to deter some states with an incredible security commitment and
a high enough ability to withstand such attempts at leverage, who will acquire nuclear technology
despite the efforts of great powers. France, for instance, successfully developed its own working
nuclear weapon despite opposition from the US during the process. I assume here that sanctioning
affects the military capability of the proliferating state; even if such sanctions are economic rather
than military, states under economic pressure maintain their military strength at the cost of some
tradeoff elsewhere.10
In addition to withstanding military or economic sanctions from a great power, autonomy
also encompasses the ability to survive preventive military strikes designed to stymie nuclear
weapons acquisition. Fuhrmann and Kreps (2010) examine instances of targeting nuclear weapons
programs and conclude that if a state’s nuclear acquisition poses a high security threat to another,
the threatened state will be willing to incur significant costs to militarily derail the proliferation
attempt. Historically, Israel has launched such preventive strikes against both Syria (Operation
Orchard) and Iraq (Operation Opera) under the Begin Doctrine. Consistent with the Debs and
Monteiro (2016) model in which great power protection can provide some cover from such attacks
and thus allow proliferation efforts to proceed, the ability to withstand such preventive strikes is
a part of the autonomy required to successfully develop nuclear weapons.
On the whole, the existing proliferation literature tends to take the proliferating states,
the great powers with which they interact, or both as homogeneous, examining either why some
states would want to pursue nuclear weapons or why other states would want to prevent them
10Likewise, while nuclear assistance may not directly increase military strength, it can free up resources in the
form of research and development costs that can instead be funneled into military budgets.
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from doing so. Without considering the strategic interactions that take place based on the identity
of both the would-be proliferator and the would-be preventer, as well as the external threat, a
crucial component in the story is missing. These interactions manifest themselves in the level
of external threat, the absence of credible security guarantees, and the hierarchical relationships
that constrain the military and economic autonomy to pursue nuclear weapons. I argue that each
of these is a necessary condition for nuclear weapons development, but no one or two alone are
always sufficient. Without a significant external threat, nuclear weapons are unnecessary. With
a credible security guarantee, they are often (but not always) overly costly. And without the
autonomy to develop a program in the face of international opposition, the questions of external
threat and credible defensive guarantees are moot.
11
Chapter 3
Model
I argue that states may be driven to follow a path of nuclear proliferation in an attempt
to ensure their own security when they lack a credible great power commitment to defend them.1
Great powers, meanwhile, use sanctions or otherwise withdraw support to deter such nuclear
pursuit. The formal model here shows that some states can be dissuaded from building nuclear
weapons by the potential for a patron to impose costly sanctions. Further, even states with a
credible security commitment cannot always be prevented from building nuclear weapons; in the
face of a threat, states may still opt to proliferate if the cost of sanctions is outweighed by the
military boost from nuclear weapons or if proliferation can deter an attack. To these unsurprising
results, I also add the finding that, even with complete information, proliferation by a subordinate
state can sometimes make a great power more likely to intervene on the subordinate’s behalf,
transforming a previously incredible defensive commitment into a credible one. Therefore, some
states may pursue nuclear weapons not only to provide directly for their own security but also to
enhance a great power’s commitment to that security. Further, a credible defensive commitment
cannot be made incredible through nuclear acquisition, meaning proliferators need not fear that
they will be abandoned after achieving nuclear status. These results show that proliferation
decisions are not one-sided, but rather depend upon a state’s existing relationships and position
in the international system, and that such decisions can in turn alter this structure.
1I use the terms proliferator, prote´ge´, partner, and ally interchangeably throughout to describe such states in
their relationship to great powers.
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3.1 Assumptions
I consider the external threats states face and the security guarantees they possess as
strategic decisions of other actors in the international system rather than simply exogenous fac-
tors in order to build a model of nuclear proliferation. Underlying the model are some critical
assumptions.
I assume that, all else equal, great powers find the military defeat of their allies more costly
if those allies are nuclear-armed. The defeat of a state in possession of nuclear weapons would
call into question the fate of those weapons; great powers should be unwilling to see them fall
into the hands of their adversaries. Further, a nuclear state facing an imminent loss is also a
risky prospect–nuclear possession carries with it the risk of a conflict escalating to levels a great
power might consider unacceptable.Therefore nuclear acquisition by a prote´ge´ may increase the
incentives of its patron to defend it in the event of an attack by raising the stakes; an increased
cost to the patron of the prote´ge´’s military defeat or escalation to nuclear use could change a
previously incredible defensive commitment into a credible one. A great power may suddenly
find it within its best interest to intervene in order to prevent a military defeat or constrain its
prote´ge´’s actions.
I also assume that proliferation decisions are observable by both a state’s patron and its
adversaries. Although states may in practice begin to develop nuclear technology in secret, there
is usually some observable hint of this endeavor. In this discussion, the decision to build nuclear
weapons may be considered the moment this decision becomes known by the relevant actors,
whether through announcement or discovery by another state.
3.2 Setup
Consider a model with three players: a non-nuclear Prote´ge´ (P), a Great Power defender
(G), and a potential Attacker (A). The model is set up with complete and perfect information;
all actions and choices are observable by all players.
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To begin, P decides to build or not build nuclear weapons, beginning down the path to
proliferation (or not). If P chooses to build, G then imposes a level of sanctions, s > 0. If P does
not build, s is not declared. Once P has made its building choice and G has made its sanctions
choice, A chooses to attack or not attack P. If A chooses not attack, the game ends in either the
original status quo (if P has not chosen to build nuclear weapons) or a revised, nuclear status quo
(if P has chosen build). If A chooses to attack, then G chooses to defend or abandon its prote´ge´. If
G defends, there is a multilateral war in which P possesses or lacks nuclear capability, depending
on her proliferation decision. If G abandons, there is a bilateral war, where P again possess or
lacks nuclear weapons according to her decision. Thus there is a war, modeled as a costly lottery,
at every node in which A has chosen to attack, after which the game ends. The resulting stage
game is shown in Figure 1.
P
G
build
s
A
G
attack
(revised SQ)
¬attack
(multilateral war, nuclear P)
defend
(bilateral war, nuclear P)abandon
A
¬build
G
attack
(SQ)
¬attack
(multilateral war, non-nuclear P)
defend
(bilateral war, non-nuclear P)abandon
Figure 3.1: Stage Game
P wins the costly lottery of war with probability p, which is a function of its own military
power mP , its defender’s power mG, its attacker’s power mA, and the level of sanctions s imposed
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on it. Formally, p(mi, α, s) = (mp + αmG −mA − s), where p ∈ (0, 1).The level of P ’s military
capability increases with nuclear acquisition, such thatmP = mP in the absence of nuclear weapons
and mP = mP in their presence, where mP < mP . The parameter α takes a value of 1 if G comes
to P ’s aid and 0 if not. Thus p takes four possible values according to P ’s nuclear status and G ’s
involvement in a war, which I abbreviate: p (non-nuclear P alone), p
G
(non-nuclear P with G), p
(nuclear P alone), and pG (nuclear P with G).
Note that although s can represent assistance rather than sanctioning, here I deal with
the latter to represent non-proliferation preferences. I assume an upper bound, s, representing
the highest level of sanctioning G is actually capable of imposing, as determined by the extent
of the subordinate state’s dependence on the great power,2 such that 0 ≤ s ≤ s. P begins the
game in possession of some good or item, valued at 1, which A can capture through war. Thus
P ’s value for the status quo is 1 and A’s is 0. If P wins a war, it keeps the item in dispute, while
its attacker A receives nothing. Conversely, if A wins, it receives the disputed item (1), while P
loses it (0). This setup assumes that G does not have a stake in the issue at hand and therefore
does not receive part of the value of the good, thus I denote G’s value for the status quo SQ.
Because I assume war is costly, any state entering a war incurs a cost c for doing so, regardless of
the outcome.
If P chooses to build nuclear weapons, it pays a proliferation cost v for the process, cap-
turing the time and resources necessary to develop such a program. Meanwhile, if P loses a war,
its patron G pays some cost k for this loss. To capture the assumption that great powers prefer
losses by non-nuclear subordinates to losses by nuclear subordinates, this cost is higher when P
has built nuclear weapons (k = k) than when it has not (k = k), where k < k.
The payoff functions for each player are as follows:
2This upper bound indicates the degree to which a great power can reduce another state’s probability of winning
a war
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UP =

pG − v − cP if multilateral war, nuclear P
p− v − cP if bilateral war, nuclear P
1− v if revised status quo
p
G
− cP if multilateral war, non-nuclear P
p− cP if bilateral war, non-nuclear P
1 if status quo
UG =

SQ− cG − k(1− pG) if multilateral war, nuclear P
SQ− k(1− p) if bilateral war, nuclear P
SQ if revised status quo
SQ− cG − k(1− pG) if multilateral war, non-nuclear P
SQ− k(1− p) if bilateral war, non-nuclear P
SQ if status quo
UA =

1− cA − pG if multilateral war, nuclear P
1− cA − p if bilateral war, nuclear P
0 if revised status quo
1− cA − pG if multilateral war, non-nuclear P
1− cA − p if bilateral war, non-nuclear P
0 if status quo
3.3 Analysis
Broadly speaking, there are three strategies great power defenders can follow, characterized
by their costs for fighting on behalf of their prote´ge´. The commitment decisions of those following
two of these strategies are fixed: some defenders are reliable, while others are unreliable. A great
power is considered “reliable” when its costs of fighting are sufficiently low that its defensive
commitment to a prote´ge´ is always credible, regardless of the latter’s nuclear status. The great
power has no incentive to defect and abandon its partner. Conversely, a great power is considered
“unreliable” when its costs of fighting are high enough that it is never expected to come to its
prote´ge´’s defense, with or without the latter’s nuclear possession.
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A great power defender will follow the third strategy when its commitment is changeable
and can be altered by its prote´ge´’s decision. The great power’s costs for fighting fall into a range for
which proliferation can make a previously unreliable great power decide to defend its ally. That
is, although the great power would not come to its partner’s aid when the latter lacks nuclear
weapons, it would defend a nuclear-armed partner. This great power is considered “entrapped.”
I therefore examine the subgame perfect equilibria when the great power follows each of
these three strategies. The focus of the analysis is on those equilibria where deterrence or defense
occurs — that is, where proliferation deters an attack that would have otherwise been launched,
or where an attack occurs and a great power defends its ally. The first two sets of equilibria
concern the great powers whose commitments are fixed, and the third set examines the case where
the commitment is changeable and can be altered through proliferation.3 The former illustrates
those cases in which the motivation of drawing a defender closer is absent, and the latter includes
situations in which this new mechanism is in play.
3.3.1 Fixed Great Power Credibility
In the first set of equilibria, P ’s decision regarding whether to build nuclear weapons does
not affect G ’s ultimate decision to defend or abandon its partner. Where G ’s costs of war are
high, it will never come to its ally’s aid, regardless of nuclear status. Here c∗G ≡ kmG is the level
of G ’s costs of war above which it will not defend P at the end of the game, regardless of whether
or not the latter possesses nuclear weapons; defending P in the event of an attack will never be
the best option.4 Thus G is an unreliable defender. This threshold for unreliability set by cG will
be lower as G ’s costs for a loss by a nuclear P (k) or the military boost P would receive from
G ’s participation (mG) decrease. That is, as the costs G faces for a loss by P diminish or as
G ’s ability to influence this outcome shrinks, G ’s incentive to get involved also decreases, and G
3All equilibria considered here require that mP −mP > s — the military gain from nuclear possession is greater
than the sanctions imposed in their pursuit — which does not seem like an unreasonable or even unlikely constraint.
4A description of all cutpoints can be found in Appendix A1.
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is more likely to have costs for fighting above the threshold. As these parameters increase, the
reverse holds. Thus G is more likely to be unreliable as these values decrease and more likely to
be reliable as they increase.
Proposition 1a shows the subgame perfect equilibrium in which G will always abandon P
and nuclear proliferation by itself can deter an attack.
Proposition 1a. When cG ≥ cG∗ and 1 − p ≤ cA ≤ 1 − p, there exists a subgame perfect
equilibrium in which P builds if p ≤ ph and does not build otherwise. A does not attack if P
builds nuclear weapons and attacks if she does not build. G sets s = 0, and Gdoes not defend
its ally, whether she builds or not.
Thus, P may choose to build nuclear weapons when A’s costs of war are low enough for him to
attack if she is not nuclear-capable but are high enough to avoid attacking if she is (1− p ≤ cA ≤
1−p). I refer to such attackers as “deterrable.” Here, P will have incentives to build when p ≤ ph,
where ph ≡ 1 − v + cP . If her ex ante probability of winning a war alone is low enough, nuclear
pursuit may be worthwhile when it can deter an attack in the first place. In such cases, the ability
of nuclear weapons to deter an attack forestalls the possibility that G will pay any cost associated
with its ally’s engagement in a conflict, and therefore G will not attempt to prevent proliferation
by P through sanctioning.
P may also choose to build nuclear weapons for her own defense. Proposition 1b shows
the subgame perfect equilibrium in which nuclear weapons cannot deter an attack but may still
be sought.
Proposition 1b. When cG ≥ cG∗ and cA ≤ 1−p, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium
in which P builds if p ≤ pγ and does not build otherwise. A attacks whether P builds or not.
G sets s > sγ if k(1 − p) ≥ k(1 − p) and s = 0 otherwise, and G does not defend its ally,
whether she builds or not.
Substantively, P may also choose to build in the face of an external security threat in which an
attack is imminent regardless of the status of her nuclear capability. Here, A is undeterrable when
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his costs for war are low. P will choose to build against this threat when her ex ante probability
of winning a war alone is low enough, or when p ≤ pγ, where pγ ≡ p− v, and when the sanctions
imposed by G are not overly costly. G will set sanctions at a high enough level to prevent P ’s
proliferation if the added military boost of nuclear weapons does not outweigh risk of paying the
higher cost that might be incurred when a nuclear P is involved in a conflict. This requires that
s ≤ sγ where sγ ≡ mP − mP − v, in essence that G is capable of setting a high enough level
of sanctions to effectively prevent proliferation. If the military boost of nuclear weapons does
outweigh the risk of paying the increased cost, or if G is unable to set sanctions sufficiently high,
then she will not impose any sanctions, as doing so would serve only to diminish P ’s military
capability and thus chances of winning the conflict.
Figure 3.2 shows the equilibrium space where D is an unreliable defender and k(1 − p) ≤
k(1 − p) (that is, when G will not prevent P from building a weapon). In the bottom third of
the figure, the adversary’s costs of war are low enough that he is undeterrable, and so nuclear
weapons can only be used for the proliferator’s own defense. In the middle third, the adversary’s
costs are such that he will attack in the absence of nuclear weapons but not in their presence.
Here, proliferation can have a deterrent effect. In the upper third, the adversary’s costs are high
enough that he will not attack, and there is no external threat. In this case, there is no incentive
for proliferation.
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SELF-DEFENSE
bilateral war, nuclear P
P builds
A attacks
G does not defend
ABANDONMENT
bilateral war, non-nuclear P
P does not build
A attacks
G does not defend
DETERRENCE
no conflict
P builds
A does not attack
G would not defend
STATUS QUO
P does not build
A does not attack
G would not defend
p
cA
1− p
1− p
p− v 1− v + cp
Figure 3.2: Equilibrium space in which the great power’s costs of war are high, cG ≥ c∗G, such that
it would not defend an ally, regardless of nuclear status, and in which a great power would not
impose sanctions for proliferation.
On the flip side of the coin, the second set of equilibria exists where G ’s costs of war are
low, such that it will always come to its ally’s aid. Here cγG ≡ kmG defines the threshold of the
cost of war. With costs below this threshold, G will always find defending its ally to be its best
option. Proposition 2a shows the subgame perfect equilibrium in which G is a reliable defender
and an attack can be deterred by nuclear proliferation in conjunction with a credible defensive
guarantee.
Proposition 2a. When cG ≤ cγG and 1− pG ≤ cA ≤ 1− pG, there exists a subgame perfect
equilibrium in which P builds if p
G
≤ ph. A does not attack if P builds nuclear weapons and
attacks if she does not build. G sets s = 0, and G defends its ally whether she builds or not.
Thus P again may choose to build nuclear weapons when A is deterrable, characterized as having
a cost of war in the range 1 − pG ≤ cA ≤ 1 − pG. Here P will again build when her ex ante
probability of winning is low, p
G
≤ ph, where ph ≡ 1− v + cP . In this case, however, P ’s ex ante
probability of war includes not only her own power, but also the military boost she will receive
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from her patron’s support. As before, when faced with a deterrable adversary, G has no incentive
to attempt to prevent P ’s proliferation through sanctioning.
With a reliable defender in the face of imminent attack, P may still choose to build a
nuclear weapon. Proposition 2b shows the subgame perfect equilibrium in which nuclear weapons
cannot deter an attack yet will still be built, even with a reliable great power defender.
Proposition 2b. When cG ≤ cγG and cA ≤ 1−pG, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium
in which P builds if p
G
≤ pγG. A attacks whether or not P builds a nuclear weapon. G sets
s > sγ if k(1 − pG) ≥ k(1 − pG) and s = 0 otherwise, and G defends its ally whether she
builds or not.
Here, A is undeterrable when his costs for war are low. P will choose to build against this
threat when her ex ante probability of winning a war is low enough, or when p
G
≤ pγG, where
pγG ≡ pG − v + nP . As in the equilibrium where the defender is reliable and the adversary is
deterrable, a proliferator’s ex ante probability of war takes into account the military assistance
rendered by a reliable defender. As before, if its ability to impose sanctions falls below the
threshold that can deter proliferation (s < sγ, where sγ ≡ mP −mP − v), a great power will be
unable to make proliferation sufficiently costly when its partner is faced with an imminent threat,
regardless of whether or not the great power is planning to come to its ally’s aid.
Figure 3.3 shows the equilibrium space when G is a reliable defender. In this set of equilib-
ria, the security benefits of nuclear weapons are found strictly in their boost to the proliferator’s
military; the great power defender’s military capability would be available to its ally whether or
not she builds a weapon.
3.3.2 Changeable Commitments
In this third set of equilibria, G ’s decision to defend or abandon its partner depends upon
P ’s decision to build nuclear weapons.5 This occurs when the great power’s costs of war fall into
5This set of equilibria requires that the more binding restraint of mP − mP > mG + s also hold. When
mG + s > mP −mP > s, a non-nuclear P ’s probability of winning a war with the aid of G becomes greater than
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DEFENSE
bilateral war, nuclear P
P builds
A attacks
G defends
ABANDONMENT
bilateral war, non-nuclear P
P does not build
A attacks
G defends
DETERRENCE
no conflict
P builds
A does not attack
G would defend
STATUS QUO
P does not build
A does not attack
G would defend
p
G
cA
1− p
1− p
pG − v 1− v + cP
Figure 3.3: Equilibrium space in which the great power’s costs of war are low, cG ≤ cγG, such that
it would always defend an ally, regardless of nuclear status, and in which a great power would not
impose sanctions for proliferation.
a middle range, rendering it an entrapped defender. The additional motivation of drawing in a
great power comes into play here; nuclear weapons become attractive not only for their defensive
military potential, but also for their potential to increase the credibility of a patron’s defensive
commitment. Thus this set involves a new dimension of the security considerations involved in
proliferation decisions.
In some instances this strengthened security commitment will reinforce the deterrent ca-
pacity of nuclear weapons. Proposition 3a summarizes the players’ strategies in this equilibrium.
Proposition 3a. When cγG ≤ cG ≤ c∗G, and 1 − pG ≤ cA ≤ 1 − p, P will build nuclear
weapons if p ≤ ph. A will not attack if P builds nuclear weapons and will attack if she does
build them. G sets s = 0, and it defends if P builds nuclear weapons and does not defend if
she does not build.
the probability of a nuclear P winning unilaterally. In this case, another equilibrium emerges in which, rather than
acting as a deterrent, proliferation can provoke an attack even as it increases a great power’s credibility. I leave
the analysis of this for future work.
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Thus when A is deterrable, proliferation can not only deter an attack, but also reinforces G ’s
commitment. P will build when her ex ante probability of winning a war is low enough, p ≤ p∗,
where again ph ≡ 1− v+ cP . Here, if the proliferator were to be attacked, her patron would come
to her defense. The great power again has no incentive to try to prevent proliferation in this case.
The other interesting result in this set of equilibria occurs when an adversary is undeterrable
and a proliferator builds a nuclear weapon, drawing her great power ally into defending her when
it would have have otherwise. This equilibrium is shown in Proposition 3b.
Proposition 3b. When cγG ≤ cG ≤ c∗G, and cA ≤ 1 − pG, P will build nuclear weapons
if p ≤ pm. A will attack whether or not P builds nuclear weapons. G sets s > s∗ if
k(1− pG) ≥ k(1− pG) and s = 0 otherwise. G defends if P builds nuclear weapons and does
not defend if she does not build.
In this equilibrium, a potential proliferator may again choose to build in the face of an imminent
threat from an undeterrable adversary. When her ex ante probability of winning alone against an
attacker is low (p ≤ pm, where pm ≡ pG − v), proliferation increases her own military capability,
but also brings the added benefit of drawing her patron into the fight on her behalf, further
increasing her probability of victory. The addition of G ’s military capability to this calculation
also increases the likelihood that the great power is unable to impose costly enough sanctions to
dissuade proliferation; to prevent nuclear pursuit, such sanctions must now outweigh both the
additional military boost of nuclear weapons and the benefit of the great power’s own military.
Here, a state (P) will build nuclear weapons when sanctions are low enough, formally when
s ≤ s∗, where s∗ ≡ mP − mP + mG − v. This value is similar to sγ, the threshold for s when
G ’s commitment (or lack thereof) is fixed, but it now also includes mG; the added benefit of a
suddenly reliable partner makes nuclear pursuit more attractive. Thus the potential to make an
incredible defensive commitment credible increases the sanctioning costs a proliferator is willing
to pay in order to reach the goal of acquisition. The addition of G ’s military capability to this
equation increases the likelihood that the great power is unable to impose costly enough sanctions
to dissuade proliferation (s < s∗).
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The equilibrium space appears in Figure 3.4. The Deterrence equilibrium characterizes the
area in which proliferation staves off an attack and draws a great power ally closer, and the Defense
equilibrium illustrates the case when a great power that would not have otherwise defended its
ally does so as a direct consequence of the ally’s nuclear acquisition.
ex ante
probability P
wins alone
A’s cost
of war
1− pG
1− p
pG − v
pm
1− v + cP
ph
ABANDONMENT
bilateral war, non-nuclear P
P does not build
A attacks
G does not defend
DEFENSE
multilateral war, nuclear P
P builds
A attacks
G defends
DETERRENCE
no conflict
P builds
A does not attack
G would defend
STATUS QUO
P does not build
A does not attack
G would not defend
Figure 3.4: Equilibrium space in which the great power’s costs of war fall into the middle range,
cγG ≤ cG ≤ c∗G, such that it would not defend a non-nuclear ally but would defend a nuclear ally,
and the great power would not impose sanctions for proliferation.
As before, the ability of the great power to set a level of sanctions high enough to dis-
suade proliferation is crucial; a patron may be unable to prevent a prote´ge´ from pursuing nuclear
weapons with the goal of securing the former’s commitment. If G is unable to impose sufficiently
burdensome sanctions, P may be able to exploit this by altering G ’s incentives to come to P ’s
defense. Substantively, if G ’s costs of fighting are high enough that they outweigh its probable
costs for staying out when P has only conventional weapons but low enough that staying out is
unacceptably risky when a nuclear P is involved, a mutable defender’s incentives can be changed
through nuclear acquisition.
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Chapter 4
Patterns of Proliferation and Response
The strategies of states in these equilibria show some broad patterns. First, in those cases
where an adversary is undeterrable, we see the level of sanctions imposed by a great power provid-
ing the binding constraint. When G ’s commitment cannot be changed (it is always either reliable
or unreliable), P will build when the sanctions imposed fall below the threshold sγ. However,
when G ’s commitment can be made credible through proliferation, P will build when the level
of sanctions is below the higher threshold, s∗. The difference between these two threshold values
(sγ and s∗) is the added benefit of G ’s military power (mG), which can be obtained through pro-
liferation. Thus when P is faced with an undeterrable adversary and the potential to make G ’s
commitment credible, it is more likely that the sanctions G is able to impose will fall below the
threshold at which P finds proliferation advantageous.
Second, in cases where A will be deterred by P ’s nuclear possession, P ’s decision is pred-
icated directly upon her ex ante probability of victory in a conflict. When she knows A will not
attack if she builds nuclear weapons, she will build only if her probability of victory without them
is low enough. When G is always a reliable defender, this condition is met when her chance of
winning with the help of her ally is low (p
G
≤ 1 − v + cP ). When G is always unreliable, P ’s
chances of winning alone (p) must be below this threshold. As p ≤ p
G
, this constraint is easier to
meet, and proliferation is more attractive. However, when G ’s commitment can be made credible
through proliferation, it is again this lower constraint that binds. Thus when proliferation can
draw a great power ally closer, a state is also more likely to build nuclear weapons when faced
with a deterrable adversary than she is when her patron is always reliable. Moreover, when an
adversary can be deterred through nuclear possession, a great power has no incentive to prevent
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its ally from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The benefit of forestalling conflict and thus bypassing
the risk of paying the associated costs is enough to allow proliferation to proceed. Thus when
states believe they will bring stability, permitting nuclear weapons may become more attractive
to great power allies.
The cases in which A is undeterrable, however, are defined in part by the level of sanctions
imposed, as the level of costs of war below which he will always attack is cA ≤ 1−p (or cA ≤ 1−pG
with G ’s aid). Because p and pG are both decreasing in s, higher levels of sanctions that weaken
P ’s ability to fight increase this critical value, making it more likely that A’s costs will be low
enough to attack regardless of P ’s decision. Therefore, below the threshold at which they deter
proliferation, great power sanctions may increase the external threat faced by their partners.
Similarly, as increasing s increases the threshold for cA below which A will attack but does not
factor into p (P ’s ex ante probability of victory), increasing sanctions also decreases the range
of values within which A can be deterred through proliferation; it becomes easier for his costs of
war to be low enough that he will always attack without affecting the value above which he will
not. In these cases, a great power will sometimes find it within its best interests to prevent its
ally from acquiring a nuclear weapon; the associated increased risk and costs may outweigh the
military benefits of possession. Thus in more volatile situations, nuclear weapons may be seen as
costlier than they are worth, causing great powers to constrain their allies.
When a state’s great power defensive commitment is in question and that great power
also has a low level of influence economically and militarily, the subordinate state is most likely
to acquire nuclear weapons. France in the aftermath of WWII provides an example of a state
whose commitment from the US was in question. Following France’s independent development of
a nuclear arsenal over US objections, the Nixon administration’s change of policy toward France’s
proliferation resulted in the U.S. not only dropping its protest, but covertly assisting in the process.
Thus the U.S. commitment that was first questioned switched not only to a decision not to sanction
France, but to active support for the proliferation process itself.
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When this commitment is in question but a great power has a high level of influence over
a subordinate state, the subordinate is likely to desire nuclear weapons but unlikely to be able
to follow through to the point of acquiring them. Thus while South Korea in the aftermath of
the Korean War was faced, like France at the end of WWII, with a US defensive commitment it
had reason to doubt, its nuclear pursuit was halted because the US had enough direct military
influence to use the threat of troop withdrawal in order to rein in the subordinate state. South
Korea’s level of dependence sowed the seeds for nuclear ambition, but it also ensured that this
ambition could be thwarted.
When a great power commitment is secure and the external threats are lower, however,
the costs of proliferation may be high enough that such spending is deemed unnecessary. This
situation describes Japan, which has officially relied on the U.S. for its defense, including in nuclear
matters, since the end of WWII. Although it is generally agreed that Japan possesses the technical
capacity to develop a working bomb within a very short period of time following any decision to
do so, the nature of threats in the region is currently such that it can afford not to take this
step unless there is a change in its security situation. The U.S. commitment is, for the moment,
sufficient.
States without a great power defensive commitment may differ from others in two important
ways. First, if the absence of a great power commitment is associated with a lack of great power
influence, then the ability of any state to impose costly enough sanctions to deter proliferation
may also be absent. For instance, South Africa’s independent development of a small nuclear
arsenal during the 1970’s and 1980’s was likely facilitated by its position outside the sphere of
influence of either the US or USSR. With neither superpower in a position to adversely affect its
military strength, South Africa’s decision to pursue a nuclear program was tempered only by the
cost of proliferating itself.
Second, if a great power commitment is completely absent, the potential to create one
may exist. Cohen (2008) argues that the absence of a great power alliance combined with the
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existential fear generated its creation in the aftermath of the Holocaust sparked the beginning of
Israel’s nuclear program under Ben-Gurion. Thus, given Israel’s size and location, the acquisition
of nuclear weapons not only provided a significant boost to its defensive military capabilities, but
it also drew the US into a closer relationship in which the possibility of a nuclear Israel’s defeat
became unacceptably costly.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
The relationship between nuclear proliferation and the reliability of great (nuclear) powers
as defensive allies is multifaceted. The circumstances of the hierarchy between two states suggest
that the anticipated response of a dominant power can dictate when a subordinate state will
choose to engage in nuclear pursuit, and those states able to withstand the cost of proliferation can
sometimes use this to bind great powers more firmly to their defense by making their own potential
military defeat or escalation of conflict unacceptably costly. States with a fear of abandonment
in the face of an external threat have a greater incentive to pursue nuclear weapons than others,
and the level of great power influence becomes a critical factor in determining their ability to
acquire them. States that are secure in their defense, however, may tend to find nuclear weapons
acquisition an unnecessary and costly venture, disinclining them to undertake such pursuit unless
they can acquire these weapons very cheaply or find that their effect on battlefield outcomes when
faced with an undeterrable adversary will be quite large. This may be the case when states are
engaged in enduring rivalries where their existence is threatened, for instance, allowing for what
could be perceived as a legitimate use of the nuclear option.
Great powers, meanwhile, frequently have incentives to constrain proliferation by their sub-
ordinates. In the presence of an undeterrable adversary, the increased risks associated with nuclear
possession may be great enough to make imposing sanctions to prevent acquisition an attractive
option. When the hierarchy is strong enough that these sanctions can be made sufficiently costly,
this course of action can prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. When a great power lacks enough
leverage to dissuade proliferation, however, its best course of action may be to instead strengthen
the credibility of its defensive commitment so that the benefit of its own military power substitutes
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for the potential boost of a nuclear weapon. The specter of acquisition can lead to a tightening
of the relationships among allies. Together the fear of abandonment in the face of an external
threat and the level of great power influence, either direct or indirect, over the military power of
a subordinate state in its hierarchy help illuminate some of the choices states make in the areas
of proliferation and counter-proliferation.
The security commitments of the US have been shaped by its preferences over non-proliferation
decisions, and this framework suggests that maintaining and even strengthening these commit-
ments may prove crucial to preventing future weapons development. States fearing the credibility
of US defensive commitments may find it worth their while to pursue nuclear weapons in order to
bind the US more closely to them. Therefore, preemptively strengthening the credibility of such
commitments may prove an effective form of counter-proliferation, preventing nuclear pursuit by
providing, more cheaply, a commitment that would be forced upon it later regardless.
A possible extension of this argument allowing for private information in which there is
uncertainty over the degree to which a subordinate state is dependent upon a great power might
also allow for sanctions resulting from a miscalculation over their likely effect. Another possibility
is that sanctioning undeterrable proliferators is designed to send a signal, either to the subordinate
state or to the international community, of the dominant state’s displeasure with the decision. Even
if sanctions cannot prevent a state from building nuclear weapons, they may provide a visible sign
that a great power is not complicit in the activity and does not approve of it. These suggest
potential avenues for further work.
A related scenario, which lies somewhat outside the scope of this model but would be
logically consistent with it, characterizes a more antagonistic relationship between two states. If
a great power has no intention of intervening on another state’s behalf, either because its costs
of doing so are always too high or because the proliferating state is not under its protection
to begin with, this would render sanctions irrelevant for its decision to defend or not. In this
case, the decision to impose sanctions may instead be designed to deter other potential would-be
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interveners from doing so as well. This approaches a somewhat different question with perhaps a
more obvious answer, asking why a state would sanction an opponent rather than a prote´ge´ for
nuclear pursuit, but it is interesting to note that the rather intuitive answer is also explained by
this general model - sanctions may make a state a more appealing target directly by weakening
its military capabilities, but also indirectly by reducing its attractiveness to other states as an
alliance partner.
Nuclear proliferation by a subordinate state within a hierarchy can thus be motivated
either by a subordinate state that is determined to build regardless of the reliability of its patron
or by an unreliable patron whose subordinate is able to increase the credibility of the defensive
commitment through nuclear acquisition. In the former instance, the costs to the subordinate
state of proliferation and the patron’s ability to impose costs are low enough and the payoffs of
nuclear possession high enough that nuclear pursuit is always worthwhile. In the latter instance,
the patron’s sanctioning ability is low enough that in some circumstances (i.e. when the patron is
unreliable), pursuit is worth bearing the costs of proliferation because the accompanying increase
in the great power’s reliability outweighs them.
It is important to note that neither the credibility of a defensive commitment nor the degree
of an external threat are static. Both can change over time, and consequently the significance of
these considerations for nuclear proliferation can also change over time. Choi and Park (2008)
argue, for instance, that the changing nature of the North Korean threat and its perception
by South Korea significantly influenced changes in the latter’s proliferation policy over the years,
making the credibility of the U.S. commitment more or less important in the process. Because these
two factors are intertwined, changes in either can push states out of the status quo equilibrium and
into the sequence captured in the model. While an external threat may be a necessary condition
for nuclear pursuit, it is not sufficient.
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Appendix 1
1.1 Great Power Credibility
In the final move of the game, G will defend a nuclear-capable P when
EUG(multilateral war, nuclear P) ≥ EUG(bilateral war, nuclear P)
SQ− cG − k(1− pG) ≥ SQ− k(1− p)
kmG ≥ cG
(1.1)
Similarly, G will defend a non-nuclear P when
EUG(multilateral war, non-nuclear P) ≥ EUG(bilateral war, non-nuclear P)
SQ− cG − k(1− pG) ≥ SQ− k(1− p)
kmG ≥ cG
(1.2)
I thus define two cutpoint values for cG, based on Equations 1.1 and 1.2. The first, c
∗
G ≡
kmG, is the threshold below which G will defend a nuclear partner. The second, c
γ
G ≡ kmG, is
the threshold below which G will defend a non-nuclear power. Note that since k < k and mG is
strictly positive, cγG < c
∗
G; if G ’s costs of war are low enough to defend a non-nuclear partner they
will necessarily also be low enough to defend a nuclear one. Thus there is no value of cG at which
G would choose to defend a non-nuclear P but would not choose to defend a nuclear P. Therefore
cγG ≡ kmG (1.3)
represents the value of cG below which G will always defend its partner, and
c∗G ≡ kmG (1.4)
is the value above which G will never defend.
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There is, however, a range of values of cG for which proliferation can make a previously
unreliable great power decide to defend its ally. Thus
cγG ≤ cG ≤ c∗G (1.5)
defines the range in which G will defend P if and only if P chooses to build nuclear weapons.
1.2 Propositions
1.2.1 Unreliable Great Powers
Proof of Propositions 1a and 1b. As demonstrated in Equation 1.4, G will never defend P
when cG > c
∗
G, where c
∗
G ≡ kcG. When this constraint holds (i.e. G will not defend its partner,
with or without nuclear weapons), A must decide whether to attack. If P has built a nuclear
weapon, A will attack when
EUA(bilateral war, nuclear P) ≥ EUA(revised SQ)
1− cA − p ≥ 0
1− p ≥ cA
(1.6)
If P has not built a nuclear weapon, A will attack when
EUA(bilateral war, non-nuclear P) ≥ EUA(SQ)
1− cA − p ≥ 0
1− p ≥ cA
(1.7)
P must therefore decide whether to build or not.
In Proposition 1a, where A is deterrable (1− p ≤ cA ≤ 1− p), he will attack if P does not build
but will not attack if she does build, and so P will build when
EUP (revised SQ) ≥ EUP (bilateral war, non-nuclear P)
1− v ≥ p− cP
1− v + cP ≥ p
(1.8)
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As p is a function of the players’ military power and sanctions imposed, p(mi, α, s) = (mp+αmG−
mA − s), Equation 1.8 can be rewritten
1− v + cP ≥ mP −mA (1.9)
In this case the level of sanctions s does not enter into P ’s calculations of whether to build a
weapon, and so G cannot prevent proliferation. However, it is also the case that G would not
want to do so even if it could. G would have an incentive to make proliferation unacceptably
costly when
EUG(bilateral war, non-nuclear P) ≥ EUG(revised SQ)
SQ− k(1− p) ≥ SQ
kp ≥ k
p ≥ 1
(1.10)
which can never be true, as p is constrained to be ∈ (0, 1). G would thus have no incentive to set
s > 0.
In Proposition 1b, where A is undeterrable and will always attack (cA ≤ 1− p), P will build when
EUP (bilateral war, nuclear P) ≥ EUP (bilateral war, non-nuclear P)
p− v − cP ≥ p− cP
p− v ≥ p
(1.11)
As p and p are functions of the players’ military power and sanctions imposed, p(mi, α, s) =
(mp + αmG −mA − s), Equation 1.11 can be rewritten
(mP −mA − s)− v ≥ (mP −mA)
mP −mp − v ≥ s
(1.12)
G must also decide whether to set sanctions high enough to prevent P ’s proliferation. It will do
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so when
EUG(bilateral war, non-nuclear P) ≥ EUG((bilateral war, nuclear P)
SQ− k(1− p) ≥ SQ− k(1− p)
k(1− p) ≥ k(1− p)
(1.13)
When this constraint is not met, or when G is incapable of setting s high enough to prevent
proliferation, the imposition of sanctions would not prevent P from building a nuclear weapon
and would only serve to decrease her chances of winning a conflict. In either case, G will set s = 0.
Additionally, if A will never attack (cA > 1− p), P will build when
EUP (revised SQ) ≥ EUP (SQ)
1− v ≥ 1
(1.14)
which can never be true.
1.2.2 Reliable Great Powers
Proof of Proposition 2a and 2b. As demonstrated in Equation 1.3, G will always defend its
partner when cG ≤ cγG, where cγG ≡ kcG. When this constraint holds (i.e. G will defend its
partner, with or without nuclear weapons), A must decide whether or not to attack. If P has built
a nuclear weapon, A will attack when
EUA(multilateral war, nuclear P) ≥ EUA(revised SQ)
1− cA − pG ≥ 0
1− pG ≥ cA
(1.15)
If P has not built a nuclear weapon, A will attack when
EUA(multilateral war, non-nuclear P) ≥ EUA(SQ)
1− cA − pG ≥ 0
1− p
G
≥ cA
(1.16)
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By assumption (mP −mP ) > s, which means pG < pG.
In Proposition 2a, where A is deterrable (1− pG ≤ cA ≤ 1− pG), A will attack if P does not build
a nuclear weapon and will not attack if she does build one. P will therefore build when
EUP (revised SQ) ≥ EUP (multilateral war, non-nuclear P)
1− v ≤ p
G
− cP
1− v + cP ≤ pG
(1.17)
As before, this can be rewritten in terms of military capabilities as
1− v + cP ≤ mP +mG −mA (1.18)
As with an unreliable great power protector, the level of sanctions s does not enter into P ’s
decision, and so G again cannot prevent proliferation. Also as before, G would not wish to do so
if it could. G would wish to impose sanctions when
EUG(multilateral war, non-nuclear P) ≥ EU(revised SQ)
SQ− cG − k(1− pG) ≥ SQ
−k + kp
G
− cG ≥ 0
kp
G
≥ cG + k
p
G
≥ cG
k
+ 1
(1.19)
As p
G
is constrained to be ∈ (0, 1) and cG and k are both positive, this can never hold. G would
again have no incentive to set s > 0.
In Proposition 2b, where A is undeterrable and will always attack (cA < 1 − pG), P will build
when
EUP (multilateral war, nuclear P) ≥ EUP (multilateral war, non-nuclear P)
pG − v − cP ≥ pG − cP
pG − v ≥ pG
(1.20)
37
As p
G
and pG are functions of the players’ military power and sanctions imposed, p(mi, α, s) =
(mp + αmG −mA − s), Equation 1.20 can be rewritten
(mP +mG −mA − s)− v ≥ (mP +mG −mA)
mP −mp − v ≥ s
(1.21)
G must again decide whether to set sanctions high enough to prevent P ’s proliferation, and it will
do so when
EUG(multilateral war, non-nuclear P) ≥ EUG(multilateral war, nuclear P)
SQ− cG − k(1− pG) ≥ SQ− cG − k(1− pG)
k(1− pG) ≥ k(1− pG)
(1.22)
When this constraint is not met, or when G is incapable of setting s high enough to prevent
proliferation, the imposition of sanctions would not prevent P from building a nuclear weapon
and would only serve to decrease her chances of winning a conflict. In either case, G will set s = 0.
Additionally, if A will never attack (cA > 1− pG), P will build when
EUP (revised SQ) ≥ EUP (SQ)
1− v ≥ 1
(1.23)
which can never be true.
1.2.3 Entrapped Great Powers
Proof of Proposition 3a and 3b. As demonstrated in Equation 1.5, G will sometimes defend
its partner if P builds nuclear weapons and will not defend her if she does not build when cγG ≤
cG ≤ c∗G. A must decide whether or not to attack. If P has built a nuclear weapon, A will attack
when
EUA(multilateral war, nuclear P) ≥ EUA(revised SQ)
1− cA − pG ≥ −nA0
1− pG ≥ cA
(1.24)
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If P has not built a nuclear weapon, A will attack when
EUA(bilateral war, non-nuclear P) ≥ EUA(SQ)
1− cA − p ≥ 0
1− p ≥ cA
(1.25)
By assumption (mP −mP ) > mG + s, which means p < pG.
In Proposition 3a, where A is deterrable (1− pG ≤ cA ≤ 1− p), A will attack if P does not build
a nuclear weapon and will not attack if she does build one. P will therefore build when
EUP (revised SQ) ≥ EUP (bilateral war, non-nuclear P)
1− v ≤ p− cP
1− v + cP ≤ p
(1.26)
As in the cases where G ’s credibility (or lack thereof) is fixed, when faced with a deterrable
adversary P ’s decision over whether to build does not rely on the value of s, and therefore G
cannot prevent her proliferation. Equation 1.26 can be rewritten as
1− v + cP ≤ mP −mA (1.27)
Also as in the previous cases of a deterrable adversary, G would have no incentive to set s > 0
even if doing so could forestall proliferation. It would only want to do so when
EUG(multilateral war, non-nuclear P) ≥ EU(revised SQ)
SQ− cG − k(1− pG) ≥ SQ
−k + kp
G
− cG ≥ 0
kp
G
≥ cG + k
p
G
≥ cG
k
+ 1
(1.28)
As shown above, this can never be true.
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In Proposition 3b, where A is undeterrable and will always attack (cA < 1− p), P will build when
EUP (multilateral war, nuclear P) ≥ EUP (bilateral war, non-nuclear P)
pG − v − cP ≥ p− cP
pG − v ≥ p
(1.29)
This can be rewritten as
(mP +mG −mA − s)− v ≥ (mP −mA)
mP −mp +mG − v ≥ s
(1.30)
which yields a higher threshold for s than in the previous cases. G will now set s > mP −mp −
+mG − v and thus prevent proliferation when
EUG(multilateral war, non-nuclear P) ≥ EUG(multilateral war, nuclear P)
SQ− cG − k(1− pG) ≥ SQ− cG − k(1− pG)
k(1− pG) ≥ k(1− pG)
(1.31)
When this constraint is not met, or when G is incapable of setting s high enough to prevent
proliferation, the imposition of sanctions would not prevent P from building a nuclear weapon
and would only serve to decrease her chances of winning a conflict. In either case, G will set s = 0.
Additionally, if A will never attack (cA > 1− pG), P will build when
EUP (revised SQ) ≥ EUP (SQ)
1− v ≥ 1
(1.32)
which again can never be true.
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